tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post3582285465332634385..comments2024-03-18T15:40:02.866+00:00Comments on Philosophical Investigations: Wittgenstein’s New Philosophy: A “No Theory” Theory?Philip Cartwrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11458571502536123264noreply@blogger.comBlogger15125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-40996328224076000532017-02-23T21:40:05.299+00:002017-02-23T21:40:05.299+00:00I'd certainly agree that we couldn't live ...I'd certainly agree that we couldn't live in anything like the way we do without the concept of causation. However, that's not the same as "every event has a cause". Indeed, there is a hugely important area of our lives where causation takes a back seat and perhaps disappears altogether: the sphere of human action. Here our attitude is precisely of a cause (the human being) which is not itself caused. And this attitude (which Wittgenstein calls "an attitude towards a soul") is an intrinsic part of the framework within which language takes place.Philip Cartwrighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11458571502536123264noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-68667840425789151202017-02-23T20:12:10.231+00:002017-02-23T20:12:10.231+00:00Oops, it's from "On Certainty" of co...Oops, it's from "On Certainty" of course.Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-38035081029788316332017-02-23T17:23:17.383+00:002017-02-23T17:23:17.383+00:00Fascinating. I really like what you say about “Eve...Fascinating. I really like what you say about “Every event has a cause” being a procedural rule we adopt towards the world. But perhaps it goes much deeper than allegiance (at least, if by “allegiance” we mean something that we can sometimes abandon without incurring dire consequences). It’s implicit in our every action, even the mistaken ones.<br /><br />"Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game." Wittgenstein §204<br />Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-52601759019211060392017-02-22T20:17:20.941+00:002017-02-22T20:17:20.941+00:00Many thanks, Jim. That last point about "Ever...Many thanks, Jim. That last point about "Every event has a cause" not being grammatical is not something I make clear in the post itself. In fact, I think I only grasped that later. If I ever get round to revising my material (and I plan to) I ought to make it clear because it has important implications.<br /><br />And speaking more generally, I would add that it's a very difficult point to keep hold of. There are some sections in Zettel (ie #608-613) touching on this topic which are truly hair-raising when you first read them. They just seem mad. But I would gloss them as follows: think of the rule of causality as a kind of crude but extremely useful tool. Why should we expect, however, that nature *must* function in this manner at all levels and in all its manifestations? Given what we already know about the strangeness and astonishing complexity of the world's structure, wouldn't it be an almost absurd coincidence if the causal rule turned out to be the first and last word on the matter?<br /><br />To put it less poetically: suppose at some stage physics reaches a point where it cannot find any clue as to where to go next. What should we say about what lies beyond that point? That there must be causes which are beyond our finite understanding? Or that here the very notion of "cause" peters out? Either choice seems to me more like an act of faith than a rational theory.Philip Cartwrighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11458571502536123264noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-71212506424900662512017-02-22T18:15:53.636+00:002017-02-22T18:15:53.636+00:00Crikey Philip, that's really illuminating. It ...Crikey Philip, that's really illuminating. It clears up a whole bunch of loose ends in one go. Thanks so much.Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-6562325164301342472017-02-22T06:51:25.637+00:002017-02-22T06:51:25.637+00:00Hi Jim. I think it's like this: if someone say...Hi Jim. I think it's like this: if someone says "Every child has a penny" this is an assertion about how things are. It can be true or false and is, at least in theory, capable of being established. We might, for example, round up all the children and search them for pennies. <br /><br />But suppose I say "Every event has a cause" and someone replies "Prove it" - what on earth am I to do now? I might show that this event and that event had causes, but what warrants the move from "these events had causes" to "every even has a cause"? On the other hand, how might I refute it? How might I prove that this event has no cause (as opposed to a cause that I don't know about)?<br /><br />"Every event has a cause" does not express a fact so much as an attitude towards the world. More exactly, it is a procedural rule we adopt when investigating why things happened. And it is warranted because it has proved its worth - so much so that we tend to take it as an obvious truth. But it is still a rule for all that, and therefore neither true nor false.<br /><br />It is not, however, a grammatical rule. It is not like "All bachelors are unmarried". To say "There could not be an uncaused event" is not to express a logical rule, but to affirm one's allegiance to the procedural rule. We could well say "This event has no cause" without distorting the concepts "event" and "cause" - indeed, something remarkably like this happens in quantum physics, where probability takes over from cause as the basic explanation of why things happen as they do.Philip Cartwrighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11458571502536123264noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-26855019416079686332017-02-21T21:11:02.398+00:002017-02-21T21:11:02.398+00:00"But “every event has a cause” is not an empi..."But “every event has a cause” is not an empirical fact (unlike, say “every child has a penny”)..."<br />Could I ask you to you flesh this out just a wee bit, Philip? It baffles me. If I am a witness to a crime, is it not the empirical facts that prove decisive? What am I missing?Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-15188374769768842462012-09-23T17:42:39.052+01:002012-09-23T17:42:39.052+01:00Hi, and thanks!
I agree with your point. There...Hi, and thanks!<br /><br />I agree with your point. There's also some interesting stuff on theories/experiments in W's Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics. In fact, I've been thinking quite a bit recently about what is or isn't a theory, because I've been considering the implications of W's approach for religion and reading The God Delusion. I intend to blog about that at some stage - either here or elsewhere.Philip Cartwrighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11458571502536123264noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-26136335858411281222012-09-23T14:19:27.698+01:002012-09-23T14:19:27.698+01:00I wanted to say hello also! I've enjoyed readi...I wanted to say hello also! I've enjoyed reading several posts on this blog. <br /><br />On the theory/non-theory debate, I think, it's not so much about the content in what you say - but rather, what claim you want to make by saying it. If you claim that giraffes really have longer necks than swans, then that is a theory. However if you just speak of it as an assumption or a 'reminder', it is not a theory. <br />Similar "The earth goes round the sun" is a theory if you claim that it's true, however no theory when you just assume it. (I think Wittgenstein makes similar point when he speaks about Moore's hand in On Certainty)<br /><br />The most important thing is to keep track of the empirical/logical distinction, I think. The philosophy of Wittgenstein circles very much around this.<br /><br />Dandre<br />http://recollectingphilosophy.wordpress.comAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-50685998297839596772011-10-03T22:36:09.335+01:002011-10-03T22:36:09.335+01:00Hi Paul. To be honest, I'm not entirely happy ...Hi Paul. To be honest, I'm not entirely happy with "a priori" myself. I was struggling to make a distinction and wasn't totally sure of the way to put it. That's why I used the qualifier "In this sense". I was really contrasting "a priori" with "empirical", but is that a legitimate classification? I've been away from academic philosophy for a long while and my terminology gets a bit sloppy sometimes.<br /><br />However, by "a priori" I certainly didn't mean "must be true for all possible worlds" or anything like that. I'd probably better point that out in the post.<br /><br />RE: the move from theory to non-theory in empirical assertions, it does seem to me to be what happens. Is "The Earth goes round the Sun" a theory for us? 400 years ago it was. Now I'd say not. However, I wouldn't die in a ditch over this because the important distinction is between empirical/grammatical assertions, not really between empirical theories/facts.<br /><br />Many thanks for your (and DR's) comments, btw. I tend to sound much more confident about all this than I really am and so it's helpful to get counter-suggestions. Really I'm just trying to figure it all out, even if I write as if I've got it down cold!Philip Cartwrighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11458571502536123264noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-35930080115499604622011-10-03T20:35:08.365+01:002011-10-03T20:35:08.365+01:00Hi Phillip - how can you even raise the possibilit...Hi Phillip - how can you even raise the possibility that Wittgenstein was not right on everything :-) I think this is a difficult area to get right and unusually I had some hesitations about some of the things you say. I don't find the theory/non-theory contrast that helpful and I am a bit worried about suggesting that some propositions are not theories for us but might be theories for other people. I also worry a bit about suggesting that grammatical points are a priori. I am pretty confident that your use of the phrase is not confusing you, but it certainly seems to me that it might confuse others.<br />So what alternative is there - I have always gone for a grammatical/substantive contrast where grammatical propositions set the rules of language and substantive propositions say something about the world. Of course, when you push on this distinction things do get pretty difficult and although I am sure Wittgenstein would have been capable to getting to the bottom of this issue, I am not sure he ever really did (and therefore of course neither have I).<br />I have some sympathy with DR's point and it does seem a bit disingenuous to say that what Wittgenstein says is very different from what other philosophers have said because no one could disagree with it and then not give much weight to the fact that lots of people seem to disagree with it!<br />Again the way I would try to avoid that problem would be simply to say that while it would certainly be a criticism of a traditional philosopher if one reacted to him by saying: that does not really give me any new insights into the world or increase my wisdom, it would not be a criticism of Wittgenstein since explicitly he is not trying to tell you something new about the world only remove your confusions.<br />So a lot of words from me and probably stuff you are very familiar with, but its what occurred to me after reading your post :-)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-4527229379819682262011-10-01T00:27:22.702+01:002011-10-01T00:27:22.702+01:00It sounds right, but I am aware that (so far) I...It sounds right, but I am aware that (so far) I've just been trotting out the Wittgensteinian line as best I can. That's the value of this blog and its major drawback, both to me personally and to anyone else who reads it.<br /><br />In fact it should have huge quotation-marks round it and the subtitle "If Wittgenstein was right on all points this is how he would sound to me".<br /><br />I can't see how far he was actually right until I fully confront his critics. But one thing at a time!Philip Cartwrighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11458571502536123264noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-86265252613530765152011-09-30T23:19:01.709+01:002011-09-30T23:19:01.709+01:00Yes, that sounds right. Makes it hard to persuade ...Yes, that sounds right. Makes it hard to persuade philosophers, but perhaps that's their fault. And it doesn't mean it's impossible. I look forward to seeing what you have to say about Quine and co.Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-14279887322948018282011-09-30T16:23:01.510+01:002011-09-30T16:23:01.510+01:00There's certainly something a bit disingenuous...There's certainly something a bit disingenuous about the claim that we'd all readily admit to "meaning is use" and I probably should've flagged that up rather than just towing the "party line", so to speak. (It's linked in my mind to W's rather cheeky habit of starting a sentence "Of course,..." and then saying something extremely controversial and/or baffling.) Indeed, I suspect most people would readily admit to TLP 3.203 but would be a bit dubious of PI 43.<br /><br />However, I don't think this hamstrings W for two reasons.<br /><br />First, it is an example of the general difficulty of carrying out W's descriptive method. Being a competent language-user doesn't require competence in surveying the uses of words - noting subtle distinctions and similarities, etc. Most people couldn't tell you the relationship between "know" and "understand" in different areas of language even though they correctly make the necessary adjustments day-in, day-out. They need to be reminded of what they already do and even then it is far from easy because habitual ways of looking at language - ingrained by years of practice - reassert themselves at every opportunity. "I see it, I see it - damn! It's gone!" is one of the characteristic experiences of attempting the descriptive method. But if they are taken through it step by step then (it is hoped) they WILL agree. If they don't then you take them through it again.<br /><br />And (point two) the important thing is that their agreement is not based on new facts. You are not trying to reform their language use but getting them to see how they already use it. So the process is still descriptive rather than theoretical.<br /><br />As for PHILOSOPHERS who disagree, I would say (sweepingly) that they haven't been able to shake off a theoretical approach to language ("rigid designators" etc). I'm reluctant to engage too fully with this at the moment because I'm more intent on getting W's position straight in my own mind. But I hope in due course to turn my attention to Quine, Davidson, Kripke et al.Philip Cartwrighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11458571502536123264noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-74323180991439652272011-09-30T15:09:38.198+01:002011-09-30T15:09:38.198+01:00This is nicely put, and I certainly agree with mos...This is nicely put, and I certainly agree with most of it. But what would you say to someone who objected to this: <i>“The meaning of a word is its use in the language” asserts what we will all admit to be true if we look carefully at our forms of expression and, in particular, at the way the word “meaning” is generally explained.</i>?<br /><br />They might object, I think, in two ways, which are possibly related. The first is that, as you say, careful looking is required here in a way that it doesn't seem to be in the mind/hat case. That one's just obvious. How important is this difference? Does it just show, as you also say, that patience and skill are needed?<br /><br />Secondly, perhaps because people don't always have this patience and skill, isn't it a fact that we <i>don't</i> all admit it to be true that the meaning of a word is usually its use in the language? Many philosophers seem to deny this, after all. I don't mean that Wittgensteinians can't respond in any way to these philosophers, but I'm not sure what the right response is.Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.com