tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post8493984919161107164..comments2024-03-28T14:10:11.988+00:00Comments on Philosophical Investigations: Meaning is Use Part 2: the Caveat and Ostensive DefinitionPhilip Cartwrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11458571502536123264noreply@blogger.comBlogger20125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-61259765718887919232015-01-19T12:36:42.079+00:002015-01-19T12:36:42.079+00:00Hi Karl - but surely what the creator provides are...Hi Karl - but surely what the creator provides are rules for the use of the neologism?Philip Cartwrighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11458571502536123264noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-15963596226124701972014-12-24T03:51:57.355+00:002014-12-24T03:51:57.355+00:00Neologisms provide examples of words whose meaning...Neologisms provide examples of words whose meanings (at least initially) are not supplied by use but rather by their creators. Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11164599797332850308noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-24792117176947681812012-04-14T00:08:29.386+01:002012-04-14T00:08:29.386+01:00"My fundamental thought is that the logical c..."My fundamental thought is that the logical constants do not represent," he says, in TLP 4.0312. That seems relevant. (But I'm no TLP guru, so I can't provide much help.)Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-40216925251474006552012-04-12T17:01:56.634+01:002012-04-12T17:01:56.634+01:00Your posts always drive me back to previously read...Your posts always drive me back to previously read (and multiply reread) sections of PI in which I invariably find ideas missed before (perhaps part of why after over a year I'm still stuck in the early 200s!). §32 is the latest victim of such a reread, and <a href="http://philosophicalinstigations.blogspot.com/2012/04/remark-32.html" rel="nofollow">my current take on it</a> may help bridge our practical-vs-logical disconnect. It was quickly thrown together for this purpose, so critical assessment will be appreciated.Charles T. Wolvertonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12309746685166449683noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-29132391456685431412012-04-12T02:16:09.513+01:002012-04-12T02:16:09.513+01:00It's interesting you should mention Quine, bec...It's interesting you should mention Quine, because in my last reply I was going to say we were straying into the argument between Quinian Naturalism and the analytic/synthetic distinction. As you suggest, that's probably something to discuss at another time, but it is important.<br /><br />For now, I'll merely say that Wittgenstein would not have agreed with Quine's view on this. On the other hand, I doubt he'd have been happy with his inclusion in the Strawson/Carnap analytic/synthetic camp either. Wittgenstein wanted to debunk the sublimated approach of Fregean/Russellian logic. But he didn't want to replace it with anything like Quine's Naturalism (he most certainly did not see philosophy and science as continuous). His distinction was between grammatical propositions and empirical ones.<br /><br />Like I say, it's an important issue, and one that has profoundly shaped the development of American philosophy over the last 60 years. But for now we'd probably best put it to one side.Philip Cartwrighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11458571502536123264noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-66630339375885251792012-04-11T15:51:02.086+01:002012-04-11T15:51:02.086+01:00I recently had much this same practical-vs-logical...I recently had much this same practical-vs-logical exchange (at the new Sellars blog), and at that time had to retreat since I didn't really get the distinction. However, in the interim I've been reading Hylton's "Quine" in which Quine's views on precisely these early aspects of learning language are discussed in detail. So although I still don't get why any aspect of it is properly called "logical", I know I'm in good company in "conflating" the practical aspect with whatever other aspect of the process that term is intended to capture. <br /><br />OTOH, I'm happy to drop the issue since my interest was only in reducing (not eliminating - my slip) ambiguity in support of building a foundation, "logical" or not.Charles T. Wolvertonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12309746685166449683noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-56046455247172339202012-04-11T09:29:44.381+01:002012-04-11T09:29:44.381+01:00I take your point, but I still think you're co...I take your point, but I still think you're conflating the empirical question of the most effective way of ostensively teaching names with the philosophical requirement for a logical foundation. The former does not approach the latter as its techniques improve because the possibility of doubt always remains. Even with your example of disembodied light, it is possible a person might think (eg) "Red" referred to that particular way of experiencing that colour. This may strike us as unlikely, but that's not the point.Philip Cartwrighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11458571502536123264noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-88583537473564758642012-04-10T16:54:58.094+01:002012-04-10T16:54:58.094+01:00Well, I think we need to review the bidding.
The...Well, I think we need to review the bidding. <br /><br />There's nothing wrong in general with ostensive teaching - it's obviously the way infants are taught. The problem with Augustinian methodology (at least as represented in the famous quote) is not that it employs ostensive teaching (actually, learning) but that it's incoherent. It assumes a child with multiple sophisticated capabilities - eg, awareness of objects, and of "elders" and their subtle expressive miens; creation of recallable memories; inference - who is nonetheless still ostensively learning primitive associations of words and objects, and also how to utter basic sounds. Assuming such abilities while one is still in the early stages of learning is a major aspect of the Given, the subject of the first half of EPM. To coherently address the foundational potential of ostensive teaching, it is necessary to think in terms of teaching an infant that has none of those capabilities.<br /><br />In that vein, I was addressing the narrow issue of ambiguity in ostensive teaching that is raised in §28 (and §35, et al) and how such ambiguity might be reduced or, ideally, eliminated. Starting ostensive teaching with composites seems an obvious mistake both practically and logically. And I see no obvious reason why - at least in principle - teaching aids that amount to simples can't be created. Eg, if ostensive teaching begins with a surface that fills the FOV and is illuminated by controlled light, there is neither visible shape nor number (ie, distinguishable features), and the ability to tailor the spectral composition of light incident on the retina makes surface characteristics irrelevant. Strictly speaking, there is no need for a surface at all since in principle, appropriately tailored light shown directly into the eye will do the job. In such an idealized environment, the learner "sees pure disembodied color". (Quoted since each of those words is problematic.) Ie, ambiguity has been eliminated in such an idealized environment. This general idea could be extended to basic shapes, etc. Multi-featured objects would arrive late to the party.<br /><br />Of course, I'm not arguing for ostensive learning as foundational for meaning, just suggesting that some of the more difficult problems arise at advanced stages. At the early stages, ostensive teaching is, in a sense, foundational since it's how infants learn the abilities that Sellars argues aren't "given".Charles T. Wolvertonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12309746685166449683noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-68138877814694733362012-04-10T10:27:30.886+01:002012-04-10T10:27:30.886+01:00Hi Charles - thanks for your comments. I'll re...Hi Charles - thanks for your comments. I'll respond bit by bit as I'm rather pushed for time at the moment.<br /><br />RE: your first paragraph, two points.<br /><br />First, if you're talking about the most effective way to teach language then that is outside Wittgenstein's philosophical concerns - it is a matter for empirical study and experimentation. The point is that we DO learn language (including the names of objects) despite there being - from a logical point of view - ambiguity in our methods. As a form of life we "get" ostensive definition. Why or how we get it is not a question the philosopher can answer. From a philosophical point of view the abilities of the form of life represent a terminus - the given (PPF 345). I think you can sum up Wittgenstein's point as follows: a logically unambiguous foundation for language is neither possible nor necessary.<br /><br />Secondly, your suggestion of a uniform red surface is not logically unambiguous. It still has a particular shape, a particular number, it's made of a particular material, it lies in a particular direction etc. All of these qualities are potential candidates for the object of the definition and so the opportunity for misunderstanding remains. Don't forget, we're trying to find a LOGICALLY unambiguous foundation for Ostensive Definition - not one that, as it happens, the vast majority of people understand the vast majority of the time.<br /><br />More to follow....Philip Cartwrighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11458571502536123264noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-61986596132756716432012-04-10T00:37:39.213+01:002012-04-10T00:37:39.213+01:00Re the examples of meanings of "king", I...Re the examples of meanings of "king", I don't see that word as necessary in any of the three either as having "meaning" (in some sense) or even as a name. <br /><br />Implicit in example i) is the assumption that the player knows what it means for a piece to be "exposed", ie, how to react to the warning. So, associating the name "king" with the appropriate piece suffices for the player to be able to demonstrate "understanding" of the warning. But even that association isn't necessary since just saying "That piece (pointing at the king) is exposed" would achieve the desired result while "eliminating the middle man". <br /><br />In example ii), there are in essence two representations of the pieces and the board (I don't see one being 2-D and the other 3-D as significant, although I will use those as convenient labels). The player knows how to proceed using the 2-D representations. Naming the 3-D pieces requires only a mapping from the 2-D piece representations to the corresponding 3-D piece representations, and the starting positions of the pieces provide that. But as in example i), the names don't seem necessary, except perhaps as mnemonics for the unfamiliar objects. <br /><br />Example iii) seems another case of unnecessary naming - the result could be achieved by saying "Please get one of these (pointing) from the cupboard." In any event, "king" is no better than "Fred" since the name is irrelevant to the task.<br /><br />Or perhaps I'm missing something.Charles T. Wolvertonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12309746685166449683noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-75240878029830794852012-04-09T21:55:32.245+01:002012-04-09T21:55:32.245+01:00Re §28:
Sellars argues that awareness of a prese...Re §28: <br /><br />Sellars argues that awareness of a presented X <b>as an X</b> is not a Given. Assuming he's correct, perhaps one teaching a child by ostensive definition should use simples rather than objects. Presenting, say, a uniform red surface (eg, a large sheet of red construction paper) while uttering "red" should remove the ambiguity. Only later should different red shapes be presented (again against a uniform background), thereby emphasizing what feature is to be associated with uttered "red". Similarly, one might want initially to present a large uniform white surface on which is drawn a black circle (or disc) while uttering "circle". But to start with, say, a red ball while uttering "red" obviously results in ambiguity as addressed in §28. Is "red" to be associated with the color, the 2-D outline, the 3-D shape, the whole integrated object, other? This seems like something that Liz Spelke-type researchers might have addressed.<br /><br /><i>If I point at various red objects saying “red” each time and you then consistently pick out red objects when asked to do so, you have correctly understood my meaning.</i><br /><br />This highlights an important point that may obscured by summarizing W's message as "meaning is use". The more cumbersome "the meaning of a word is its role in a language game" (this general idea also appears in Part VII of Sellars' EPM) seems better but still possibly incomplete, depending on how one interprets "role". The quote from Philip's post makes it explicit that "use" or "role" should be interpreted as including a speaker's objective, namely either to cause the hearer to act or to change the hearer's dispositions to act. As indicated in the quote, "meaning" in that expanded sense is understood if the hearer responds as intended by the speaker. Various aspects of this interpretation of "meaning" appear in the early sections of PI (discussed <a href="http://philosophicalinstigations.blogspot.com/search/label/ostension" rel="nofollow">here</a> under the sections labeled "ostension").<br /><br />This raises a question about Davidson's position that "only sentences have meaning". I started to write that I'm inclined to agree because even when the builder simply shouts "Slab!", that utterance functions as a command, ie, a sentence. But my vague impression is that Davidson's position is based on the truth bearing feature of propositions, and a command presumably doesn't have such a feature. Thinking of meaning in terms of intended responsive action seems to evaporate distinctions like sentence vs command vs proposition. Which I'm inclined to say is just fine since I have come to think of all "mental" issues in terms of generic action-response pairs (although with due consideration of possibly relevant aspects of underlying neural issues). Any opinions on this re Davidson?Charles T. Wolvertonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12309746685166449683noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-78303241434785238272012-04-06T00:38:58.966+01:002012-04-06T00:38:58.966+01:00I have a horrible feeling that my rather nifty sym...I have a horrible feeling that my rather nifty symbols for "pointing", "apple" and "king" don't show up on other people's browsers (though I can see them on mine). It's a shame, because I enjoyed hunting them out and incorporating them, but I'll substitute something more basic idc.Philip Cartwrighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11458571502536123264noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-20376836227516324952012-04-06T00:35:00.224+01:002012-04-06T00:35:00.224+01:00Hi Charles.
I look forward to your comments on §4...Hi Charles.<br /><br />I look forward to your comments on §43. I have one more post on meaning, and then (thank heavens) I'll be through with it (for now).Philip Cartwrighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11458571502536123264noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-83314648536237690992012-04-06T00:32:53.110+01:002012-04-06T00:32:53.110+01:00Hullo, fella. It's good to be back!Hullo, fella. It's good to be back!Philip Cartwrighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11458571502536123264noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-55891979639787954232012-04-06T00:31:54.516+01:002012-04-06T00:31:54.516+01:00Hi Frank (or Paul!)
Thanks for your kind words, I...Hi Frank (or Paul!)<br /><br />Thanks for your kind words, I appreciate it. I hope my point about the diverse nature of "meaning" is pertinent, though I was also using it to save face after not spotting the bleeding obvious! :)Philip Cartwrighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11458571502536123264noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-61778989889496005812012-04-06T00:26:53.857+01:002012-04-06T00:26:53.857+01:00Hi Nick.
I vaguely recall Wittgenstein having a f...Hi Nick.<br /><br />I vaguely recall Wittgenstein having a fair amount to say about connectives in the Tractatus [A little help, please, TLP gurus!]. By the time of the Investigations, however, they don't get much of a look in, although I suppose they're lurking in the background when he states that language doesn't function like a logico-mathematical calculus. Basically, however, these words fall squarely under the "meaning is use" rubric. Are they rigidly defined? I'm not sure. Compare: "The square root of 25 is either 5 or -5". "It's either him or me". "Dr Strangelove, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb". Does "or" play the same role in each case?<br /><br />The only one that really features is the logical solecism concerning "is" (or "="). Interestingly, this point is also in the Tractatus and plays an important part (albeit in a rather different context) at various points in the PI. It's also linked to issues regarding "the same", which (I think) is a hugely significant term in the Investigations.Philip Cartwrighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11458571502536123264noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-74117814496235809112012-04-05T20:07:26.160+01:002012-04-05T20:07:26.160+01:00Philip -
Yet another "welcome back!"
...Philip -<br /><br />Yet another "welcome back!" <br /><br />During much of your absence I've been struggling with meaning et al and will have several things to say about your post after digesting it a bit more. For the moment I'll just note that re §43, your lucid distinction between the "meaning" of words and other uses of "meaning" is what I was trying to capture <a href="http://lwpi.blogspot.com/2011/10/wittgensteins-toolkit.html?showComment=1319395164841#c2633564258296114427" rel="nofollow">here</a> with "linguistic" and "non-linguistic". Ie, I second your speculation about "but not for all".Charles T. Wolvertonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12309746685166449683noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-9283884396376567012012-04-05T17:50:43.582+01:002012-04-05T17:50:43.582+01:00Ah! Good to be reading you again. Thanks for this...Ah! Good to be reading you again. Thanks for this.jollekdhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05743734210902639684noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-74606555942606515522012-04-05T14:41:39.071+01:002012-04-05T14:41:39.071+01:00Hi Phil. Welcome back! And it has surely been wort...Hi Phil. Welcome back! And it has surely been worth the wait. Great post with a nice and convincing punch in the tail. I wonder if there is a link here with the idea that words are not just tools we use but also gestures we make. When we are in danger of getting metaphysical, it is useful to focus on use so we do not tie ourselves up in confused knots, but as you suggest, we shouldn't forget that some aspects of meaning are not primarily about getting things done. [Frank aka paul!]Paul Johnstonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08676164388115825863noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6701420428167031490.post-11283448590040912972012-04-05T14:19:05.248+01:002012-04-05T14:19:05.248+01:00Hi Phil,
So my reading of this is that Wittgenste...Hi Phil,<br /><br />So my reading of this is that Wittgenstein is anticipating an objection concerning words like logical connectives: "and", "or" and so forth. With words like this, which do not function to pick objects out, W.'s characteristic worries about metaphysics will not arise by admitting that their definitions are (relatively?) fixed. But this was purely speculative on my part... does it make sense to you?Vanitashttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03190524739107446297noreply@blogger.com